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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
There are two appellants on this second appeal: Glade Leon Parduhn and 
University Texaco. University Texaco was a general partnership formed by written 
agreement in 1979 and dissolved July 14, 1997 on the sale by the partnership to Blackett 
Oil Company of its two service stations and the real property on which the stations were 
located. Parduhn and Brad Buchi were the only partners of University Texaco, and were 
partners for the eighteen-year duration of the partnership. Brad Buchi died 
approximately three weeks after the partnership was dissolved, in early August 1997. 
Appellees include the original defendant and counterclaimant Natalie Buchi-
Bennett, Brad Buchifs oldest daughter. Through the process of compulsory joinder 
initiated by Parduhn, Natalie's siblings, Allison, Annabelle, Lance and Jessica Buchi 
were joined as defendants and are among the appellees. By the same process, Brad 
Buchifs second wife, Jo Anne, was added as a party. Jo Anne Buchi was joined and made 
her appearance in two capacities: personally and as personal representative of the estate 
of Brad Buchi. 
The parties will be identified throughout this Brief by their first names, not out of 
any disrespect, but to reduce confusion. Multiple parties and persons identified in the 
Brief have the surname Buchi, including Brad (the decedent), Lissa (Brad's first wife), 
most of Brad and Lissa's children, and Jo Anne (Brad's second wife). 
-ii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES viii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 5 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE 10 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 21 
ARGUMENT 25 
I. EQUITY SHOULD NOT DETERMINE DISTRIBUTION 
OF THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS, AS JOANNE AND 
BRAD'S CHILDREN WAIVED ANY DEFENSE OR 
CLAIM BASED ON SECTION 31A-21-104 BY FAILING 
TO PLEAD IT 25 
A. Glade Properly Preserved his Argument that 
JoAnne Waived any Defense or Claim Based 
on Section 31A-21-104 by Failing to Plead it 
Prior to April 7, 2000 26 
B. Glade Expressly Made this Argument a Point 
of Appeal on the First Appeal to this Court 27 
C. As the Supreme Court did not Address this 
Issue on the First Appeal, Glade Should be 
Allowed to Again Present it, and ask for a 
Ruling, on this Second Appeal 27 
-iii-
D. JoAnne's Argument that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-21-104 Overrides and Eviscerates Glade's 
Rights Under a Contract of Insurance is, Under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure and Precedents 
Established by this Court, an Affirmative Defense 
that She Must have Pleaded 28 
E. None of the Appellees Identified Loss of Insurable 
Interest and Section 31A-21-104 as an Avoidance/ 
Affirmative Defense in Their Pleadings, nor was 
Either Mentioned Until Well After the Deadline 
for Amendment of Pleadings had Passed 31 
F. Glade's Rights as a Beneficiary Under a Contract 
of Life Insurance Should not be Overridden on the 
Basis of a Statute thai Would have Presented an 
Affirmative Defense, but that was Waived by 
Failure to Plead it 32 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S "EQUITABLE95 DISTRIBU-
TION OF LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
PROCEEDS CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE REFUSED TO 
CONSIDER ANY EVIDENCE ON REMAND THAT 
CONTRAVENED HIS APPARENTLY PRE-
CONCEIVED DETERMINATION OF WHO 
SHOULD HAVE THEM 33 
A. The Supreme Court on the First Appeal Remanded 
this Case with Instructions to Determine who was 
Equitably Entitled to Them 33 
B. The Trial Court (at least Purportedly) Refused to 
Consider any Evidence Other than that Presented 
in the August 2001 Trial, in Determining that 
Jo Anne and Brad's Children were Equitably 
Entitled to all the Insurance Contract Proceeds 33 
-iv-
C. The Prior Trial, However, was not Conducted with 
The Objective of Determining who was Equitably 
Entitled to Insurance Contract Proceeds 34 
1. Evidence as to Who Might "Equitably" 
be Entitled to Contract Proceeds was not 
Fairly Contemplated, as an Issue at Trial, 
as JoAnne's Affirmative Defense Predicated 
on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104 had Been 
Waived by Her Failure to Plead it 35 
2. The Court Declined at Trial to Receive 
Evidence that Would Have Been Relevant 
to the Issue of Who Would be Equitably 
Entitled to the Proceeds 35 
3. Glade was Prevented from Presenting 
Evidence Reserved for a Second Trial, 
Which Would have been Relevant to the 
Issue of Equitable Entitlement 37 
D. The Trial Court Refused to Consider Evidence 
on Remand, Which is Relevant to the Question 
of Who Should in Equity Receive the Insurance 
Proceeds (if Glade's Contractual Right to them 
was Avoided by Section 31A-21-104) 39 
E. The Trial Court's Decision that JoAnne and Brad's 
Children are Equitably Entitled to Proceeds is 
Flawed by its Failure to Consider all Evidence 
Relevant to that Issue 41 
F. The Trial Court's Findings and Holding on Remand 
are Further Flawed Because They Were Based on 
Evidence not Presented at Trial 41 
-v-
1. The Trial Court Found "Persuasive" the 
Supposed Sale of the Partnership's Personatl 
Property, for Which There is no Support in 
the Evidence at Trial 42 
2. The Trial Court also Based its holding 
on Remand in Part, on its Finding that 
the Partners "Treated the Partnership 
Casually" and that the Partnership 
Proceeds Were Frequently and Regularly 
Used for Personal Expenses, Though 
There was No Evidence of this at Trial 44 
III. THE "EQUITIES" DO NOT FAVOR AN AWARD 
OF ALL OR A PORTION OF THE PROCEEDS 
TO JOANNE AND/OR TO BRAD'S CHILDREN, 
IN PREFERENCE TO GLADE, UNIVERSITY 
TEXACO, ORBRAD'S ESTATE 45 
A Equity Cannot Condone an Award of Any of the 
Proceeds to JoAnne 45 
B. The Evidence at Trial was Inadequate to Support 
an Award, in Equity, of One-Half the Proceeds 
to Brad's Children 49 
IV. AN AWARD IN EQUITY CANNOT BE BASED 
ON AN AGREEMENT THAT THE SUPREME 
COURT HAS HELD IS NOT ENFORCEABLE 50 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON REMAND 
IN DECIDING TO AWARD THE PROCEEDS 
BASED ON WHAT IT IMAGINED THE 
PARTNERS WOULD HAVE DONE WITH 
THE POLICIES HAD BRAD LIVED LONGER 51 
-VI-
VI. WITH THE DEMISE OF THE BUY-SELL 
AGREEMENT, THERE NO LONGER EXISTS A 
BASIS FOR A NON-TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER 
DIRECTLY TO BRAD'S HEIRS, BYPASSING HIS 
ESTATE 55 
VII. AN AWARD IN EQUITY BASED ON "INTENT" 
DIVINED FROM AN UNENFORCEABLE BUY-SELL 
AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT, IN ANY EVENT, 
DIVERT MORE THAN $100,000 TO DEFENDANTS 56 
VIII. IF DEFENDANTS' DEFENSE BASED ON SECTION 
31A-21-104 WAS NOT WAIVED, AND EQUITY THUS 
GOVERNS WHO SHOULD HAVE THE INSURANCE 
PROCEEDS, THEN THE PROCEEDS SHOULD GO 
TO GLADE 57 
A. A Primary Purpose of Section 31A-21 -104 
is to Pre-empt the Common Law Remedy of 
Avoidance of Insurance by the Insurer, if the 
Beneficiary is Concluded not to Have had an 
Insurable Interest in the Insured's Life 57 
B. On the Facts of this Case, Equity Warrants an 
Award of the Insurance Proceeds to Glade 59 
1. There is no Reason in Justice and Fairness 
that Glade Should not be Awarded the 
Proceeds 59 
2. In Justice and Fairness, the Insurance 
Proceeds in this Case Should be Awarded 
to Glade 59 
CONCLUSION 64 
ADDENDUM [separate document] 
-Vl l -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Bakerv. Hatch. 257 P.673, 676 (Utah 1927) 27 
Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) 2, 3, 41 
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) 29 
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984) 29 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer. 94 U.S. 457, 
24 L.Ed. 251 (1877) 54, 58 
Culbertson v. Continental Assur. Co.. 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981) 8, 53 
Dalbv v. Life Ins. Co.. 15 C.B. 365 (1854) 54 
Esswein v. Rogers. 216 Cal. App. 2d 91, 30 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1963) 61 
Fischer v. Fischer. 2003 Ky. App. Lexis 215 (2003) 38 
Girard Bank v. Halev. 332 A.2d443 (Pa. 1975) 38 
Goergen v. Nebrich. 174 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) 38 
Golding v. Ashley Central Irr. Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990) 29-32, 35 
Graves v. Norred. 510 So.2d 816 (Ala. 1987) 61-62 
Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981) 41 
Jones v. Simmons. 209 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. App. 1973) 53, 61 
LHIW. Inc. v. De Lorean. 753 P.2d 961 (Utah 1988) 45 
Le Grand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson. 420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966) 27 
Oglesbv-Barnitz Bank & Trust Co. v. Clark. 175 N.E.2d 98 
(Ohio App. 1959) 5,24, 54, 57 
-viii-
Parduhn v. Bennett. 2002 UT 93 6, 26, 33, 38-39, 53 
Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp.. 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983) 29 
Pratt v. Board of Educ. 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977) 29 
Rich v. Class. 643 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1982) 62 
Ridley v. VanderBoegh. 511 P.2d 273 (Ida. 1973) 59, 62 
Ryan v. Tickle. 316 N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1982) 58 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983) 29 
Triple I Supply. Inc. v. Sunset Rail. 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982) 28, 32 
STATUTES 
Statute 14 Geo. Ill, C. 48 57 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104 5, 20, 25-29, 31-32, 34-35, 39, 46, 58, 62 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28 52 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-34 9 
Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-201 5, 55 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) 28 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) 28, 29, 32 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) 28, 32 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) 28, 29, 32 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) 2-5 
TREATISES 
43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance, § 977 (1982) 54 
Appleman on Insurance § 871 61 
2 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice. §763 (1966) 54 
1 Freedman's Richards on Insurance § 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 (6th ed. 1990) 54, 57-58 
Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.5(3) (1988) 61 
-x-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Can and should this Court on this appeal adjudicate Glade 
Parduhn's claim that defendants waived their defense based on Section 31A-21-104 by 
failing to plead it? Can and should it do so where it ignored Parduhn's claim in the first 
appeal, but where Parduhn preserved the claim on the first appeal, clearly presented it to 
the Supreme Court for adjudication, and preserved the claim on remand? This issue 
presents an issue of law. The issue was properly preserved for appeal by Parduhn's two 
motions to strike the defense, R.l 147, 1399; by his presentation of the claim to the 
Supreme Court on the first appeal, Appellant's Brief (Jan. 24, 2002) at 9, 34, 37-39; and 
by his preservation of the claim on remand, R.l 673-1674, 1707-1711. 
Issue No. 2: If the Supreme Court retains authority to rule on the preceding claim, 
then (1) did the trial court err by failing to strike the defense as an avoidance that was 
not pleaded? and (2) was the Supreme Court therefore mistaken in remanding the case 
with instructions to determine who, based on § 31A-21-104, is equitably entitled to the 
proceeds? If the answer to both these questions is "yes>" then should not the proceeds, 
in contract, be distributed to Parduhn as the beneficiary designated by the policy to 
receive the proceeds on Brad Buchi's death? Again, this issue presents an issue of law. 
The issue was preserved for appeal. See Issue No. 1. 
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Issue No. 3: Can the trial court's finding on remand that Jo Anne Buchi and 
Brad's children are equitably entitled to the insurance proceeds be sustained where (1) 
the trial court refused to conduct another evidentiary hearing; (2) the court refused 
Parduhn's proffer on remand of evidence that would countenance against an award in 
equity to defendants; (3) the first trial was not calculated to determine who in equity 
should receive the proceeds; (4) the trial court refused Parduhn permission to present 
evidence reserved by a stipulation for bifurcation approved by a prior judge; and (5) the 
trial court, contrary to its declaration, did in fact base its findings on remand on 
"evidence" that defendants assured him had been presented at trial, but was not. 
Findings of fact in cases of equity will generally not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Nonetheless, findings "in equity" must have some 
basis in the record, Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991), and will be reversed if 
the appeals court has a definite and firm conviction that the court has erred. LI The 
trial court, as stated in its Ruling and Order dated May 14, 2003, declined to take new 
evidence "tailored to the issue before the court." Ruling at 9. Parduhn's argument and 
proffers on remand reserved the above issues for appeal. See Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition to Proposed Order [on Remand] (March 24, 2003); Transcript of Oral 
Argument (March 14, 2003); and Transcript of Oral Argument (May 9, 2003). 
Parduhn's request to put on evidence reserved by bifurcation was made, and thus 
preserved for appeal, at R.1466, 1469 and 1501. 
Issue No. 4: It is error for the trial court to have awarded half the insurance 
proceeds in equity to Jo Anne Buchi where (1) she has breached her fiduciary duty to 
Brad's estate by failing to articulate in this action its equitable claim to the proceeds; (2) 
there was no evidence that Brad intended JoAnne to have them; and (3) there was no 
evidence at trial as to JoAnne and Brad's relationship other than they were still legally 
married? Generally speaking, findings in equity will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Findings in equity, however, must have some basis in 
the evidence before the court. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). This 
argument was preserved on remand. Oral Argument (May 9, 2003); Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Order (March 24, 2003). Whether JoAnne's 
breach of her fiduciary duty as personal representative disqualifies her equitable 
entitlement under the doctrine of "unclean hands" is likely a matter of law for this Court 
to decide. This aspect of Parduhn's argument was made, and thus preserved, at 
Plaintiffs Memo., kL at 14-15. 
Issue No. 5: Can an award in equity be based on an agreement that the Supreme 
Court previously held to be unenforceable? This issue arises as a product of the trial 
court's decree on remand, Ruling and Order (May 14, 2003) at 9, that it could discern 
the partners' intent from the buy-sell agreement and, on the basis of that intent, 
determine who is equitably entitled to the proceeds. This decision and rationalization, in 
effect, enforces against Parduhn the agreement the Supreme Court deemed was not 
enforceable. Plaintiff believes that this is likely an issue of law. This argument was not 
-3 -
expressly preserved for appeal, because it did not arise until the trial court's 
pronouncement in its Ruling and Order on May 9. 
Issue No. 6: Can the trial court's speculation that the partners would have given 
the policy on Brad's life to Brad had he lived longer be sustained as anything other than 
speculation, and can this speculation be the basis of an equitable award of all the 
policy's proceeds to Brad's heirs? This was not an issue until the trial court's issuance 
of its Ruling and Order on May 14, 2003. Findings of fact should be sustained unless 
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Whether the Court's finding of fact will 
support its award of proceeds on equitable grounds should present an issue of law. 
Issue No. 7: Can an equitable award of proceeds which bypasses Brad Buchi's 
estate in favor of Jo Anne and Brad's children be justified, given that there no longer 
exists an enforceable agreement that can effect a non-testamentary transfer pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-201? Plaintiff believes this issue presents a question of law, for 
which no deference will be accorded the trial court's decision. This argument was made 
and thus preserved by Plaintiffs Memo, in Opposition to Proposed Order (March 24, 
2003) at 10-11; also at Hearing Transcript (May 9, 2003) at 43-44. 
Issue No. 8: Can the trial court on remand base an award in equity on an 
unenforceable buy-sell agreement, from which it inferred an "intent" by the partners to 
divert all the proceeds to the insured's survivors rather than to the beneficiary, if the 
buy-sell agreement was never amended to provide that one partner might have to pay the 
other partner $300,000 (or $250,000) instead of the $100,000 on which they had agreed 
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in 1984? An obligation or intent based on the buy-sell agreement would no longer seem 
to be an issue, given that the Supreme Court previously decreed it to be unenforceable 
by Brad Buchi's heirs. As the Supreme Court decreed that the buy-sell agreement was 
no longer enforceable, it logically chose not to address Parduhn's argument on the first 
appeal that there was no competent evidence to show that it had been amended, relying 
on Oglesbv-Barnitz Bank & Trust v. Clark. 175 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio App. 1959). See 
Appellant's Brief (Jan. 24, 2002) at 61-74. If the buy-sell agreement, notwithstanding 
its non-enforceability, is to be the basis of an award on equitable grounds, then the 
Supreme Court needs to revisit and decide the implied amendment issue that Parduhn 
raised and challenged on the first appeal. 
Issue No. 9: Should the Supreme Court, based on the facts before the trial court, 
decree that Parduhn is equitably entitled to the proceeds? This agreement was preserved 
for appeal, by Glade having made it on remand. Plaintiffs Memo, in Opposition to 
Proposed Order (March 14, 2003) at 7-8. The trial court's findings to the contrary, 
however, should, under the traditional standard of review, be overturned only if clearly 
erroneous. Utah R Civ P. 52(b). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104 (see addendum). Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-201 
(see addendum). 
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APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Glade Parduhn and Brad Buchi in 1979 formed a partnership, University 
Texaco, for the express purpose of owning and operating a service station business. 
They operated their business for 18 years. In the later years they were in business 
together, the partnership owned and operated a Texaco station at 901 East South 
Temple (which Brad managed) and a Chevron station at 4013 South Wasatch 
Boulevard (which Glade managed). 
The partnership was dissolved on the partnership's sale of its two service 
stations and real property to Blackett Oil Company, on July 14, 1997. See Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 2002 UT 93, j^ 8. The partnership then entered a winding-up phase, in which 
it remains. Glade and Brad met shortly after the partnership's sale of its stations for 
the purpose of identifying and paying partnership debts. Some were paid and some 
were not before Brad died in early August, 1997. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 6 (death 
certificate). 
The two partners, in 1979, documented their business relationship in a written 
partnership agreement. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 1. Appended to the partnership 
agreement was language that functioned as a buy-sell agreement. IdL The addendum 
stated that each partner was insured for $20,000 and that, should one partner die, that 
sum would go to the deceased partners wife or survivors as consideration in payment 
by the surviving partner for the deceased partner's share. 
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In 1979, when the partnership was formed, Glade was married to Nedra. They 
had two children. Nedra died in 2002, while this case was first on appeal. Brad in 
1979 was married to Lissa. They had five children, all of whom have been joined as 
parties. Brad and Lissa divorced in 1992. Trial Transcript, pp. 110-111. 
In January 1984, the two partners amended their previous buy-sell agreement by 
a hand-written notation they both signed. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2. Each partner 
purchased insurance on the life of the other in the amount of $100,000, which was the 
amount that each partner agreed to pay the other's "wife and survivors" for his 
partner's interest should the partnership be dissolved by death of a partner. 
In early 1989, the partners each applied to and acquired from Northern Life 
Insurance Company increased insurance policies on the other's life. Glade acquired 
ownership and was the named beneficiary of a whole life policy on Brad's life in the 
amount of $300,000. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3. Brad acquired ownership and was 
named the beneficiary of a whole life policy on Glade's life, but in the lesser amount of 
$250,000. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4. Glade and Brad cross-assigned ownership of the 
two $100,000 policies they had purchased five years earlier. 
The partners' 1989 purchase of the two previously identified policies, however, 
was not accompanied by another written amendment to their buy-sell agreement. 
Glade never agreed to pay more than the $100,000 that in 1984 he agreed to pay 
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Brad's wife and survivors for Brad's interest, should University Texaco be dissolved 
by Brad's death. Trial Testimony (G. Parduhn), pp. 28-29. 
The evidence at trial established that the partnership paid the premiums on the 
two policies. Trial Testimony, (G. Parduhn), pp. 47-48. However, each was a whole 
life policy, which accrued a cash surrender value that inured to the benefit of the 
policy's owner. 
The policy at issue was owned by Glade, not the partnership. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 3, pp. 3,11, and p. 2 of Application. Only Glade, as the owner (not the 
partnership and not Brad) had the right under the terms of the policy to change the 
designation of the beneficiary. Id. pp. 3 (definition of "you") and 10; Culbertson v. 
Continental Assur. Co.. 631 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah 1981). The accumulated cash 
surrender value under the policy belonged to Glade. 
The other policy, on Glade's life, was owned by Brad. It was not owned by the 
partnership, or by Glade. Only Brad, as owner of that policy, had the right to change 
the designation of himself as beneficiary. He, not the partnership, owned the right to 
the cash surrender value that accumulated under his policy. 
At approximately the same time as the partners applied for and purchased the 
two aforementioned policies, also in 1989, Brad (as insured) and Lissa (as 
owner/beneficiary) applied for and purchased from Northern a third policy. This 
policy insured Brad's life for $250,000. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 5. It designated 
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Brad's wife, Lissa, as the owner and primary beneficiary. His children were 
designated as the "contingent beneficiary." For the quite obvious reason that he would 
not marry her for another three years, the policy did not mention JoAnne. 
Lissa thereafter, in September 1990, petitioned the court to grant her a divorce. 
The divorce was finalized in March 1992. 
In May 1992, Brad married JoAnne Ross Williams. Trial Transcript (JoAnne 
Buchi), p. 151. They had no children together. JoAnne petitioned the court for a 
divorce in April, 1996. Buchi v. Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case 
No. 964901449. The divorce was pending but not finalized when Brad died in August 
1997. 
Immediately following the sale of the stations on July 14, 1997, Glade and Brad 
met and began the process of paying partnership bills that remained to be paid and 
winding up the affairs of the partnership. Trial Transcript, (G. Parduhn), pp. 35-37. 
Brad, as disclosed earlier, died in early August, 1997. The payment of partnership bills 
and the winding up of the partnership's financial affairs continued after Brad's death 
under the supervision of its surviving general partner, Glade. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-34. 
The winding up phase has included defending against three lawsuits filed against the 
partnership after Brad's death. 
Subsequent to Brad's death, JoAnne was appointed as the personal 
representative of his probate estate. See Jo Anne's Counterclaim, 115, R.275, 279. 
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Although it is hard to believe given the self-serving position she has taken in this 
litigation, it is a position of responsibility she still holds. In re Estate of Brad Buchi. 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 973901394. Brad did not leave a 
will. Trial Testimony (JoAnne Buchi) p. 153. 
Subsequent to Brad's death, Lissa applied for and received the $250,000 
payable on the third policy, even though she had divorced him five years before and 
even though all his future child support obligations had been paid in advance, and 
satisfied. Brad and/or Lissa had paid the premiums on the policy. 
Glade applied for the $300,000 payable on the policy he owned, which he was 
contractually entitled to receive as the beneficiary designated by the policy. However, 
Natalie Buchi Bennett, Brad and Lissa's oldest daughter, wrote Northern and claimed 
that she, her siblings, and her mother (Lissa) were the "legal" and "proper" 
beneficiaries of the policy. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 15. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE 
Glade filed an action in the Third District Court, seeking a declaration that he 
was entitled to the proceeds. R. 1. Northern interpleaded the $300,000 into court 
where, on arrangements made by Glade, it was placed in an interest-bearing account. 
Natalie counterclaimed, alleging that she was entitled to the proceeds. On Glade's 
motion (not Natalie's or Northern's) the remainder of Brad's children and Jo Anne, 
personally and as personal representative of Brad's estate, were joined as parties. 
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In the counterclaim portion of her Answer, Natalie claimed that she "and her 
siblings, not Parduhn, are the beneficiaries of the policy, "as amended," on Brad Buchifs 
life." f^ 12, R.279. She also claimed entitlement to the insurance proceeds based on 
Glade's and her father's buy-sell agreement, which she asserted they had amended as to 
amount in 1984 and then again "on September 11, 1990"1 (a year afer the 1989 policies 
were purchased), "to provide for $300,000 on Buchi's life and $200,000 on Parduhn's 
life." Tf 6. Her counterclaim sought a declaration that "Glade Parduhn has no interest in 
the proceeds of Northern Life Insurance Policy No. NL00989085 on Brad Buchi's life." 
R.16. Nowhere in Bennett's Answer, Counterclaim or "Cross-claim", however, did she 
mention Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104. She did not suggest that her claim to proceeds 
was based on Glade's lack or loss of an insurable interest in Brad's life. She did not 
contend that there existed a statute that trumped the insurance contract. 
Bennett's siblings and Jo Anne were added as parties as a consequence of Glade's 
"Motion to Compel Counterclaimant to Join Necessary Parties or to Dismiss 
Counterclaim. R.250. This motion was granted on March 10, 1999. R.272. 
On April 9, 1999, Brad's children and Jo Anne, individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Brad Buchi, filed an "Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim." R.275. This was the final pleading filed by Brad's children and the only 
]This date refers to a handwritten note of that date, Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3, on 
which someone wrote that the buy-sell agreement needed to be amended. The trial 
court gave his note no weight in its decision that followed the first trial. R.1449. 
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pleading ever filed by or on behalf of Jo Anne. Counterclaimants sought a declaration 
that they and not Glade were entitled to all the insurance contract proceeds payable on 
Brad's death. As before, this claim was premised on the partners1 buy-sell agreement as 
amended in 1984, and as allegedly amended again "on or about September 11, 1990." 
ffij 5, 6 at R.278. Counterclaimants alleged this made them "the beneficiaries of the 
policy on Brad Buchi's life." R.279 at f^ 12. Again, the counterclaimants did not base 
their claim to the insurance proceeds on § 31A-21-104. 
On September 21, 1999, Glade moved for partial summary judgment. Motion at 
R.356; Memo, at R.350. This motion sought declarations that Glade's obligation to 
defendants under the buy-sell agreement (assuming, arguendo, that it was triggered by 
Brad's death) could at most be $100,000 and that his purchase obligation (if he had any) 
should be paid to Brad's estate. Brad's children filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. R.403, 400. Jo Anne neither opposed Glade's motion nor joined in the motion 
filed by Brad's children. 
On December 9, 1999, two months after her opposition to Glade's motion was 
due and only after it had been noticed up for decision, JoAnne filed a belated "Request 
for Stay of Proceedings." R.474. She finally retained counsel who, on January 19, 
2000, converted her request for a stay into a motion. R. 483. Glade opposed the motion 
and the nine months' delay it would eventually produce. Memo at R.485. Nonetheless, 
Jo Anne's request was granted. 
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On March 14, 2000, following expedited discovery, JoAnne filed a lengthy 
memorandum which opposed Glade's September 1999 motion for partial summary 
judgment. R.501. JoAnne opposed Brad's children to the extent they claimed that they, 
alone, were entitled to all the insurance proceeds paid on Brad's death. Memo, at 
R.502-503. JoAnne countered that she should share in the proceeds, as Brad's wife at 
the time of his death. JoAnne, however, avoided mention of Brad's probate estate, 
though she was its personal representative. JoAnne founded her argument on the 
partners' buy-sell agreement, which she contended had been amended in 1989 when the 
partners each increased their life insurance coverages (even though the policies were not 
uniformly increased). Memo, at R.515-518. JoAnne admitted that by the time of Brad's 
death, the partnership had been dissolved and that it had entered the "winding up" phase 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28. Memo. atR.504, 518. Nonetheless, 
JoAnne contended that the buy-sell agreement remained enforceable at the time of 
Brad's death. Eschewing her fiduciary duty as the personal representative of Brad's 
estate, she adopted the position espoused by Brad's children that the allegedly amended 
buy-sell agreement acted as a non-testamentary conduit to funnel all life insurance 
proceeds directly to Brad's survivors, thus by-passing his estate and its creditors. She 
did not, however, base her claim on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104. The statute is not 
mentioned in her memorandum. 
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On March 24, 2000, the Court (Stirba, J.) entered an Amended Scheduling Order. 
R.617. The new Scheduling Order decreed that all motions except motions in limine 
were to be filed by August 18, 2000. The Scheduling Order also mandated that 
"Motions to Amend Pleadings . . . shall be filed on or before 4/7/2000." No motions to 
amend were subsequently filed. The Order also set trial for December 11, 2000. 
By Memorandum Decision dated May 22, 2000, R.623, the Court (Stirba, J.) 
denied Glade's motion for partial summary judgment. The Court ruled that any sum that 
might be owed by Glade pursuant to the buy-sell agreement would be a non-
testamentary transfer and thus, it would bypass Brad's estate.2 It agreed that Jo Anne 
was still married to Brad when he died and therefore, would be included in the 
definition of "survivor" under the language of the buy-sell agreement if it was 
enforceable. R.632.3 
On August 18, 2000, Glade again moved for summary judgment. R.810; Memo. 
R.759. The premise of this motion, unlike those before, was that University Texaco was 
dissolved prior to Brad's death and, 
2The Supreme Court, however, held on the first appeal that the partners1 buy-sell 
agreement did not survive the dissolution of the partnership. 
3Although it was later to recant and vacate its decision, R.1222, the court also 
decreed that Brad's children and Jo Anne were entitled to receive and share in at 
least $100,000 of the insurance proceeds. R.633. 
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as such, Defendants have no rights or entitlement under 
a buy-sell agreement that would have become effective 
had the partnership, instead, been dissolved on the 
death of one of its partners. Parduhn, accordingly, is 
not obligated to pay Defendants $ 100,000, or $300,000, 
under a buy-sell agreement. He, therefore, is entitled as 
a matter of law to the $300,000 in life insurance 
proceeds payable on Buchi's death, as he is the sole 
beneficiary of the policy. 
As the partnership was dissolved prior to Brad's death4, Glade argued that his 
purchase obligation under the buy-sell agreement was not triggered and that the Utah 
Partnership Code should govern the division and distribution of partnership assets. 
R762-771, 1023-1029. Neither Jo Anne nor Brad's children founded their opposition to 
Glade's motion on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104. R.894 (JoAnne's Memo.); R. 1002 
(Buchi Children's Memo). On October 27, 2000, the Court (Stirba, J.) denied Glade's 
motion, R.l 106, concluding that there existed disputed issues of material fact. 
JoAnne's insurable interest argument based on § 31A-21-104 was first raised by 
a pseudo "Motion in Limine," filed October 26, 2000. R.l093; Memo, at R.l096. 
Jo Anne, for the first time, identified the statute: 
It is Jo Anne Buchi's position that the entitlement to the 
proceeds is controlled by U.C.A. 31A-21-104 as 
amended. This statute requires the Court to order the 
distribution of the proceeds of the life insurance policy 
to Brad's wife and survivors since Glade Parduhn does 
following trial, Judge Lubeck found and held that dissolution of University 
Texaco occurred on July 14, 1997. R.1448, 1451. Defendants did not appeal this 
ruling and, in any event, the Supreme Court agreed. Parduhn. 2002 UT 93, If 8. 
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not have an insurable interest as of the time of Brad 
Buchi's death. 
Motion in Limine at R. 1094. In her Memorandum, Jo Anne argued that: 
As of the time of Brad Buchi's death, Glade Parduhn did not 
have an insurable interest in Brad's life and pursuant to U.C.A. 
31A-21-104, he cannot collect the proceeds from the life 
insurance policy. 
R.l098. Glade moved to strike JoAnne's motion, R.l 147, complaining that JoAnne's 
potentially dispositive "motion in limine" was predicated on a statute, 
not before pleaded by Ms. Buchi as an affirmative 
defense to Mr. Parduhn's claim that he, as the owner 
and beneficiary of a life insurance policy, is entitled to 
the proceeds of the policy upon death of the insured. 
Moreover, Jo Anne Buchi's Counterclaim is not 
predicated on the referenced statute. 
R.l 151.5 Faced with Glade's Motion to Strike, Jo Anne withdrew her so-called "motion 
in limine.'1 R.1206. 
All parties were preparing for a trial scheduled for December 11. On 
December 5, 2000, however, the trial was "bumped" by a criminal case. R.1206, 1208. 
The trial was rescheduled to April 30, 2001. R.1208. The Record does not indicate 
why, but the April 30 trial date was also vacated. A third trial date was set for 
5Glade also protested that the motion did not involve any evidentiary issues, but 
was really one for summary judgment; and that the deadline set by the Court for 
the filing of dispositive motions had passed two months before. R.l 147, 1150. 
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August 21, 2001. Judge Lubeck was assigned to the case sometime after the December 
trial date. 
Bifurcation was approved by Judge Stirba in a conference prior to the 
December 11, 2000 trial date. A stipulation concerning the bifurcation was signed and 
delivered to trial court prior to the August 21, 2001 trial, but was not stamped as filed 
until August 27, 2001. R.1459. The Stipulation did not contemplate a reservation of 
issues relevant to an equitable distribution if the policy was avoided pursuant to Section 
31A-21-104. What it did contemplate was a potential set-off claim by Glade, against 
whatever sum the trial court might decree that he must pay to Brad's survivors under the 
terms of the buy-sell agreement. R.1461, f^ 2. If the buy-sell agreement required Glade 
to buy Brad's half partnership interest even though the partnership had been dissolved 
before Brad's death, Glade contemplated that he should be allowed to set-off against 
such a contractual obligation the diminished value of Brad's half interest caused by 
Brad's dissipation of his half interest prior to his death. 
On August 16, 2001, Glade filed a Trial Brief. R.1271-1294. JoAnne filed her 
Trial Brief the same day. R.1295-1398. Brad's children did not submit a Trial Brief. 
JoAnne's Trial Brief resurrected the insurable interest/31A-21-104 argument that 
had briefly surfaced in October 2000, but now it was the cornerstone of her entitlement 
argument. R.1299 (last paragraph), 1307-1310. Glade immediately objected to the 
introduction of this unpleaded affirmative defense. The next day, Glade filed a "Motion 
for Determination that any Defense by JoAnne Buchi based on Utah Code Ann. §31A-
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21-104 has been Waived." R.1399; Memo, at R.1401. Glade's motion was heard the 
day before trial, and was denied. R.1412. (Lubeck, J.) 
The case was tried on August 21-22, 2001. R.1444. The trial court (Lubeck, J.) 
awarded half the insurance proceeds to Jo Anne and half to Brad and Lissa's children, 
finding that (1) as the insurance policy was ambiguous as to whom it designated as 
beneficiary, the court could deduce from extrinsic evidence that Brad intended the 
proceeds payable on his death to go to his children and JoAnne6, (2) that the buy-sell 
agreement, in any event, acted as a conduit by which all $300,000 of the insurance 
proceeds must pass to Brad's children and his surviving spouse, and (3) that the buy-sell 
agreement evidenced a non-testamentary transfer intended by Brad, which enabled the 
court to award the $300,000 directly to Brad's heirs while bypassing his estate and 
creditors with claims against his estate. Memorandum Decision, R.1448. 
Glade sought to put on evidence at a second trial that he understood had been 
reserved by the parties' Stipulation. See Glade's Motion to Modify Memorandum 
Decision (September 5, 2001) (R.1466); Glade's Memo, in Support of Motion to Modify 
Memorandum Decision (R.1469). See also Glade's Memo, in Support of Motion to 
Stay Enforcement of Judgment (September 12, 2001) in which he argued that, "Not all 
the parties' claims have been resolved, a reality evidenced and corroborated by the 
6This finding is especially puzzling given that Brad did not marry JoAnne until 
three years after the policy was issued. 
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Stipulation that was filed with the Court before trial." R.1501, 1502. Without first 
deciding these motions, Judge Lubeck entered judgment and, without notice to Glade, 
released the escrowed proceeds to defendants. R.1547. He later denied all of Glade's 
post-trial motions. Judgment and Order (October 16, 2001), R. 1586. With respect to 
Glade's request that he was entitled to a second trial phase, the Court decreed that: 
1. Plaintiff is not entitled to a second phase trial in any 
respect, but specifically regarding alleged offsets against 
Jo Anne Buchi or the Buchi children. The Court's 
Memorandum Decision of August 27, 2001 addressed all the 
issues referenced in the stipulation of the parties dated 
August 21, 2001 between Plaintiff and Jo Anne Buchi and 
the Buchi children. Plaintiffs claims of offset, if any, 
should be asserted against the Estate of Brad Buchi and not 
against JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children individually. 
R.1588. 
The trial court denied Glade's motion for a stay pending appeal. Id. The 
Supreme Court, however, stayed enforcement of the judgment and ordered appellees to 
return and re-deposit with the Third District Court all unspent monies that had been 
released to them. R.1591, 1596, 1598, 1606. JoAnne, however, had already spent all 
the proceeds prematurely distributed to her, using most of it to extinguish the first and 
second mortgages on her home. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling which awarded the 
insurance proceeds to JoAnne and to Brad and Lissa's children. Parduhn v. Bennett, 
2002 UT 93. The Supreme Court held that the Northern policy at issue was not 
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ambiguous, and that it unambiguously designated Glade as the owner of the policy and 
the beneficiary of the proceeds be paid on the contingency of Brad's death. The 
Supreme Court also held that the buy-sell agreement did not survive the dissolution of 
the partnership. It held that, as dissolution was triggered by the sale of the service 
stations and cessation of business, rather than by the death of a partner, the winding-up 
phase of the partnership should proceed in accordance with Utah's partnership law, 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-1 et seq. 
The Supreme Court, however, in a matter of first impression under Utah law, 
held that by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104 Glade was divested of his 
otherwise contractual right as beneficiary to receive the insurance proceeds. It 
concluded that the statute divested him of his contractual right because, Glade "lost" his 
previous insurable interest in Brad's life when the partnership dissolved in mid-July, 
1997. The court therefore remanded the case for a determination of whom, pursuant to 
the statute, was equitably entitled to the proceeds. 
On remand, the trial court, without trial or additional evidentiary hearing, 
ignoring all evidence proffered by Glade and University Texaco as to why it would be 
inequitable to award the proceeds directly to JoAnne or Brad's children, and rejecting 
Glade's argument that the proceeds should be equitably awarded to him, or to University 
Texaco or Brad's estate, if not to him, again awarded all the insurance proceeds to 
JoAnne (50%) and to Brad's children (50%, apparently to be divided among them). The 
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trial court declined to enter findings of fact proposed by defendants. Ruling and Order 
(June 16, 2003). Its findings are therefore as set forth in its Ruling and Order entered on 
May 14, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendants waived any defense based on Section 31A-21 -104 by their failure 
to plead it. The trial court, therefore, erred when it denied Glade's motion to strike the 
defense and thus allowed the statute to become an issue at trial and on appeal. Glade on 
the first appeal addressed his waiver argument to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme 
Court inexplicably ignored it. Glade's claim therefore remains to be adjudicated. If 
JoAnne's argument based on Section 31A-21-1047 is in fact an "avoidance" that she 
waived by her failure to plead it, then the Supreme Court should not have remanded the 
case to determine who is equitably entitled to the proceeds. If a defense based on the 
statute was waived, then the proceeds of the policy should under contract law go to the 
beneficiary designated by the policy to receive them, Glade Parduhn. 
2. If it remains appropriate and necessary to decide who is equitably entitled to 
the proceeds, then the trial court's determination on remand cannot be sustained. It 
cannot be sustained for multiple reasons, including (1) the court refused on remand to 
conduct a second evidentiary hearing; (2) the first trial was not calculated to determine 
7Brad's children never argued the statute as the basis of a diversion of proceeds to 
them, not even in their prior Brief to this court. 
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who in equity should receive the proceeds; (3) the court refused on remand Parduhn's 
proffer of additional evidence that would countenance against an award in equity to 
defendants' and (4) the court, contrary to its self-declaration, did in fact base its 
equitable award on evidence proffered by defendants on remand, which was not 
presented in the course of the prior trial. The findings by the trial court on remand are 
so tainted by its deliberate refusal to consider additional facts "tailored to the issue" at 
hand, and its selective non-critical acceptance of "evidence" proffered by defendants 
that was not presented and tested at trial, that it cannot be sustained. 
3. An award of the proceeds to Jo Anne cannot be sustained on equitable 
grounds where (1) she has breached her fiduciary duty to Brad's estate by ignoring and 
failing to articulate its equitable claim to the proceeds while unabashedly pursuing her 
own claim, to the estate's potential detriment; (2) there is no evidence that Brad 
intended JoAnne to have the proceeds on the policy at issue; and (3) there was no 
evidence at trial regarding the quality of her and Brad's relationship (which evidence 
proffered on remand indicated was non-existent or poor). 
An award of the proceeds to Brad's children in equity is also not supported by the 
evidence where (1) there is no evidence that Brad intended them to have the proceeds of 
the policy (but he did on others); (2) there was no evidence at trial concerning the 
relationship between father and children; (3) the children did not pay the premiums; (4) 
the children did not own the policy; and (5) the policy did not name the children as the 
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beneficiary of the policy. Also, the partnership has an equitable claim in preference to 
Brad's children, where Brad managed to divert for their future support as a consequence 
of his death almost $70,000 in partnership funds. 
4. The trial court erred on remand when it based its equitable distribution of 
proceeds on the partners' buy-sell agreement, even though the Supreme Court had 
decreed that Brad's heirs could not enforce it. The trial court was wrong to infer 
"intent" based on this unenforceable agreement and, having divined the partners' intent 
from the unenforceable agreement, then in effect enforcing it. 
5. The trial court erred on remand by deciding to award the proceeds to Brad's 
heirs based on how it speculated the partners would have "divided up" the policies. This 
finding is pure speculation and finds no support in the trial record. Moreover, it ignores 
several critical facts, including that the policies were owned, not by the partnership, but 
by the individual partners - who controlled their fate. Cross-assignment of ownership of 
the policies, which the court imagined is what would have happened had Brad lived 
longer, is only one of the possible options that would have been available to the 
partners; and it is pure speculation which of the options the partners would have selected 
had Brad lived longer. Most critically, Brad died before the possibility imagined and 
predicted by the court occurred. 
6. The trial court erred on remand in concluding that it could in equity still 
award the proceeds directly to Brad's heirs, and thus bypass Brad's estate, given that the 
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buy-sell agreement can no longer serve as a non-testamentary conduit for partnership 
monies as the Supreme Court held it to be non-enforceable. 
7. The trial court erred on remand in finding that the partners' "intent" could 
be gleaned from the non-enforceable buy-sell agreement, and then based on that finding 
of "intent," award all the proceeds of the policy to Brad's heirs. If an equitable award 
can be based on intent allegedly discerned from an unenforceable agreement, then it 
again becomes a material issue on appeal whether the partners in 1989 "implicitly 
amended" their prior 1984 agreement to pay $100,000 to the other's heirs should the 
partnership be dissolved by their death. Glade argued on the first appeal, and argues 
again here as his claim was not then resolved, that the fact that the partners chose in 
1989 to purchase increased insurance on each other's life ($300,000 and $250,000 vs. 
$100,000), but did not in writing amend their prior 1984 agreement, is not a sufficient 
warrant for concluding that they implicitly amended their prior buy-sell agreement. See 
Oglesbv-Barnitz Bank & Trust Co.. 175 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio App. 1959). 
8. If defendants' defense based on Section 31A-21-104 was not waived, then 
the proceeds of the policy should in equity be awarded to Glade. There is, first, no 
reason in equity that Glade should not receive the proceeds. This is not a situation 
where Glade, as a stranger, "wagered" on Brad's life when the policies were purchased 
in 1989; he obtained the policy with Brad's consent; and no public policy is violated by 
giving Glade the proceeds. Glade should have the proceeds as Brad consciously 
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designated Glade as the beneficiary who should receive them. Equity should also favor 
Glade where he had an insurable interest in Brad's life for eighteen years, and perhaps 
not for only two to three weeks. Equity also favors Glade given that Brad's heirs 
allowed the policy on Glade's life to be cannibalized and lapse, without first tendering 
ownership of that policy to Glade. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EQUITY SHOULD NOT DETERMINE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
INSURANCE PROCEEDS, AS JOANNE AND BRAD'S CHILDREN 
WAIVED ANY DEFENSE OR CLAIM BASED ON SECTION 31A-21-104 
BY FAILING TO PLEAD IT, 
A threshold issue that remains to be decided on this second appeal is whether a 
purported lack of insurable interest can be the basis for avoiding contract rights under a 
life insurance policy, per Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-21-104, where none of the 
defendants/appellees identified the statute or pled it prior to the May 19, 2000 deadline 
established by the trial court for amendment of pleadings. According to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure and prior cases decided by this Court, JoAnne's eleventh hour defense 
based on Section 31 A-21-104 is an avoidance waived by her failure to timely plead it. If 
JoAnne's defense was waived, then the trial court should not have been charged with 
determining who was "equitably" entitled to the proceeds. If this statutory defense was 
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waived, then Glade should receive the proceeds to which he is otherwise entitled to 
receive as the beneficiary unambiguously designated as such by the policy.8 
A. Glade Properly Preserved his Argument that JoAnne Waived any Defense 
or Claim Based on Section 31A-21-104 by Failing to Plead it Prior to 
April 7. 2000. 
An issue on appeal generally must have been preserved for appeal, by having 
presented it first to the trial court. Glade clearly made and preserved this argument for 
appeal by and through his two motions to strike. 
When JoAnne, on October 26, 2000, for the first time suggested in the context of 
her so-called motion in limine that Glade had lost his insurable interest in Brad's life 
and that Section 31 A-21-104 divested him of his contractual status as beneficiary, Glade 
immediately - and properly - moved to strike the newly articulated defense. R. 1151. 
Faced with Glade's motion to strike, JoAnne withdrew her "motion in limine." R.1206. 
Glade also protested the next time the defense was raised, in JoAnne's Trial Brief 
filed just days before the August 21, 2001 trial. Glade immediately moved to strike, as 
waived, any defense or claim predicated on § 31A-21-104. R.1399. Glade thus 
preserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his second motion to strike, and to 
assail as error any subsequent ruling predicated on § 31 A-21-104 or his alleged lack of 
8The Supreme Court, in its Opinion dated September 6, 2002, held that the 
insurance policy at issue unambiguously designated Glade as the beneficiary 
named by the policy, 2002 UT 93, f 7, and overruled the trial court on this key 
issue. 
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an insurable interest in Brad's life. He preserved the argument for this appeal, by 
making it again on remand. R. 1673-1674, 1707-1711. 
B. Glade Expressly Made this Argument a Point of Appeal on the First 
Appeal to this Court. 
Glade's argument that an avoidance of his contract rights based on Section 31A-
21-104 was an affirmative defense that defendants had waived by failing to timely plead 
it, was pointedly framed and presented in the first appeal. Appellant's Brief (Jan. 24, 
2002) at 9, 34, 37-39. Clearly, this issue was squarely presented to the Supreme Court 
for decision. 
C. As the Supreme Court did not Address this Issue on the First Appeal 
Glade Should be Allowed to Again Present it, and ask for a Ruling, on this 
Second Appeal. 
The Supreme Court's Opinion entered on September 6, 2002, for reasons that are 
not clear, avoided the claim of waiver that Glade had raised. As the Supreme Court did 
not resolve the issue squarely presented to it for decision, Glade's waiver argument 
remains an "open" and unadjudicated issue. 
The right of access to courts "for the adjudication of grievances and the 
settlement of disputes is a fundamental and important one." Le Grand Johnson Corp. v. 
Peterson, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah 1966). This Court has held that, "It is the duty of [a] 
trial court to find upon material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failure to do so is 
reversible error." Le Grand, supra (quoting Baker v. Hatch, 257 P.673, 676 (Utah 
1927)). There is no reason to believe that an appeals court should adhere to a lesser 
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standard. It should pass on legitimate issues on appeal that are addressed to it, 
especially if the issue is squarely presented and founded on law, as was Glade's 
argument that defendants waived any defense based on Section 31A-21-104 by failing to 
timely plead it. 
D. JoAnne's Argument that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104 Overrides and 
Eviscerates Glade's Rights Under a Contract of Insurance is. Under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Precedents Established by this Court, an 
Affirmative Defense that She Must have Pleaded. 
Rule 12(b) Utah R. Civ. P., states that, "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party 
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that 
the following defenses [not relevant here] may at the option of the pleader be brought by 
motion . . ." Emphasis added. Rule 8(c) requires that, "In pleading to a preceding 
pleading,9 a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and 
award,. . . waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or an affirmative 
defense." Emphasis added. Rule 12(h) provides that a party "waives all defenses and 
objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply . . ." See, Triple I 
Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail 652 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Utah 1982) (as existence of a bond 
would constitute an avoidance, it had to be pleaded by defendant; and the defense was 
9A "counterclaim" is not recognized as a "pleading," see Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a); but 
consistent with Rule 13 it may be included as part of an answer or a reply to a 
counterclaim, which are. 
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waived as defendant did not plead it); Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1983) (statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, else it is waived); 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983) (statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, else it is waived); Pratt v. 
Board of Educ. 564 P.2d 294, 298-299 (Utah 1977) (mitigation of damages is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded, else it is waived); Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) (waiver is an affirmative defense that must be 
pleaded and defendants' failure to do so resulted in a waiver of the defense). "A court 
may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor within 
the theory on which the case was tried." Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. 680 
P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). 
According to Pratt, supra at 298: 
Since an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope 
of plaintiffs' prima facie case, any matter which does not 
tend to controvert the opposing party's prima facie case 
should be pleaded and is not put in issue by a denial 
pursuant to Rule 8(b). 
A party, furthermore, may move to strike "an avoidance" that was not pleaded in 
response to an initial pleading. Such a motion should be granted. Golding v. Ashley 
Central Irr. Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990). 
JoAnne's "loss of insurable interest" argument predicated on §31A-21-104 is 
clearly an avoidance, as she has argued that it trumps and negates Glade's otherwise 
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unambiguous contractual right as a beneficiary to insurance proceeds payable on Brad's 
death. According to the Supreme Court in Golding, the defendant's contention that 
plaintiffs action was barred by the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act (§§ 57-14-1 
to-7) was "certainly" an "avoidance," 
inasmuch as it denies liability not because the allegations of 
the complaint are not true, but because the legislature is 
claimed to have relieved the irrigation company of the 
liability usually associated with the negligence. Therefore, 
to preserve the Act as a defense, it had to be raised in the 
irrigation company's answer. 
Goldmg, supra at 899. Emphasis added. 
Jo Anne, at oral argument, herself characterized the statute as a "prohibition" 
which, under her interpretation, would in this case prohibit payment of benefits to the 
beneficiary, as otherwise dictated by the insurance contract. Transcript, August 20, 
2001, at p.28 line 21 and p.31. Jo Anne argued, however, that the waiver dictated by 
Rules 8(c) and 12(h) did not apply since her position was predicated on a statute. 
R.1424, 1427. However, Golding held that an immunity defense predicated on a statute, 
the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 et seq., was 
"certainly" an "avoidance" that would be waived by the defendant's failure to identify 
and plead it. Golding. supra at 899. 
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E. None of the Appellees Identified Loss of Insurable Interest and 
Section 31A-21-104 as an Avoidance/Affirmative Defense in Their 
Pleadings, nor was Either Mentioned Until Well After the Deadline 
for Amendment of Pleadings had Passed. 
Section 31A-21-104 was not mentioned in any pleading. It was not mentioned in 
defendants'Amended Answer and Counterclaim, filed April 9, 1999. R.275. The 
statute and its alleged effect was never asserted in opposition to Glade's pretrial motions 
for summary judgment. 
Brad's children not only never pleaded the statute, but never at any time prior to 
trial identified it or argued it as a basis for diverting life insurance proceeds to them 
instead of the beneficiary due them by contract. Brad's children did not argue, even on 
appeal, that Utah Code Ann. §31 A-21-104 warranted the equitable diversion of proceeds 
to them. See Brief of Appellees (the Buchi Children) (Feb. 15, 2002). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-21-104 was not even in their list of determinative statutes. Brief at 6. 
At oral argument on Glade's motion to strike, the trial court seemed to agree that 
the statute had the characteristics of an avoidance. Transcript, August 20, 2001, pp. 28, 
31-32, 41-42. Nonetheless, and ignoring the May 19, 2000 deadline that Judge Stirba 
had set for amendment of pleadings, Judge Lubeck denied Glade's motion to strike on 
the ground that Glade had notice of Jo Anne's statutory based claim via her earlier filed 
but promptly withdrawn "motion in limine." Id. p.43. However, her avoidance claim 
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based on Section 31A-21-104 had already been waived, as of October 26, 2000. 
Goldmg, supra: Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(b) and 12(h). 
F. Glade's Rights as a Beneficiary Under a Contract of Life Insurance 
Should not be Overridden on the Basis of a Statute that Would have 
Presented an Affirmative Defense, but that was Waived by Failure 
to Plead it. 
Glade's argument should not be ignored. Moreover, unless the Supreme Court is 
willing to ignore Rules 8(c), 12(b) and 12(h) and overrule or distinguish its prior 
precedents articulated in Golding, Triple I Supply, and numerous other cases, §31A-21-
104 cannot (no matter how it is interpreted) be the basis in this case for overriding the 
express, otherwise unambiguous provisions of a life insurance contract. The trial court 
erred on August 20, 2001 in not granting Glade's motion to strike and allowing Jo Anne 
to base her defense on Section 31A-21-104 at trial. If defendants' defense based on 
Section 31A-21-104 was waived, then this case should not have been remanded after the 
first appeal to decide who was entitled to the proceeds. Instead, the proceeds should 
have been distributed as the contract of insurance provides. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S "EQUITABLE" DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT PROCEEDS CANNOT BE SUSTAINED 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE REFUSED TO CONSIDER ANY 
EVIDENCE ON REMAND THAT CONTRAVENED HIS APPARENTLY 
PRE-CONCEIVED DETERMINATION OF WHO SHOULD HAVE 
THEM, 
A. The Supreme Court on the First Appeal Remanded this Case with 
Instructions to Determine who was Equitably Entitled to Them. 
For reasons that the Supreme Court did not fully explain in its prior Opinion, it 
held that Glade no longer held an insurable interest in Brad's life when Brad died in 
early August 1997. Consequently, it held that Glade was by statute divested of his 
contract right as the beneficiary of the policy. It reversed the judgment of the trial court, 
it expressly reversed the prior award of proceeds to Brad's survivors, and it remanded 
with instructions to the trial court "to equitably distribute the proceeds in a manner 
consistent with this opinion." Parduhn v. Bennett. 2002 UT 93,118. 
B. The Trial Court (at least Purportedly) Refused to Consider any Evidence 
Other than that Presented in the August 2001 Trial in Determining that 
Jo Anne and Brad's Children were Equitably Entitled to all the Insurance 
Contract Proceeds. 
The trial court, in its Opinion on remand, declares that its equitable decree was 
based solely on the testimony and exhibits received in the prior trial, on August 21, 
2001. 
. . . The court does not believe it needs to have a further 
evidentiary hearing . . . . This court believes that it can 
decide the equities based on what is before it. This court 
does not consider materials provided in the pleadings in the 
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form of depositions but only considers the evidence from 
the trial. The Supreme Court did not direct that further 
evidence be taken in this matter. This court heard the trial 
and received and considered exhibits from events in 1979, 
1984 and 1989 and later. The court believes that is the 
best evidence as to the intent and conduct of the parties, 
rather than now entertaining someone's opinion and 
rather than now hearing facts tailored to the issue before 
the court. The parties had opportunity to present whatever 
evidence they deemed proper and the court heard such 
evidence. 
Emphasis added. 
C. The Prior Trial However, was not Conducted with the Objective of 
Determining who was Equitably Entitled to Insurance Contract Proceeds. 
The trial court in its May 14, 2003 Ruling justified its refusal to consider 
additional factual evidence "tailored to the issue before the Court," and that Glade 
proffered on remand, on its rationalization that "the parties had [had] opportunity to 
present whatever evidence they [had] deemed proper and the court had heard such 
evidence." This statement is nonsense. First, Glade did not have fair notice that he 
should have to present evidence of "equitable entitlement" to the proceeds, as an 
affirmative defense based on Section 31A-21-104 had been waived by defendants' 
failure to plead it. Second, the court refused at trial to receive evidence that would have 
been relevant to a determination of who, in equity, would be entitled to the proceeds. 
Third, and subsequent to trial, the court ruled that Glade could not present evidence at a 
phase two trial that he thought had been reserved and that, as it turns out, would have 
been relevant to the issue of equitable entitlement. 
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1. Evidence as to Who Might "Equitably" be Entitled to Contract 
Proceeds was not Fairly Contemplated, as an Issue at Trial as 
JoAnne's Affirmative Defense Predicated on Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-21-104 had Been Waived by Her Failure to Plead it. 
Neither Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-21-104 or the argument that it might operate to 
negate Glade's contractual rights as beneficiary are identified in the defendants' 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed on April 9, 1999. R.275. 
Aside from the identification of the statute in her Trial Brief filed five days 
before trial, JoAnne's only prior mention of the statute and its suggested application in 
this case was in the context of a procedurally defective motion made six months after the 
deadline for amendment of pleadings, that she withdrew when confronted by a motion to 
strike. According to Golding, supra at 899, Glade's motion to strike should have been 
granted had JoAnne not withdrawn her motion, as the defense by that time had been 
waived by her failure to plead it. Not only did Brad's children not plead the statute as a 
defense, they never once identified it prior to trial; nor was their appeal founded on the 
statute. There was no reason for Glade to contemplate prior to August 16, 2001 that this 
statute would become the focus of JoAnne's defense and that he should be prepared to 
present evidence relevant to his and others' equitable entitlement to the proceeds. 
2. The Court Declined at Trial to Receive Evidence that Would Have 
Been Relevant to the Issue of Who Would be Equitably Entitled to 
the Proceeds. 
The trial court refused to receive evidence that Brad, prior to his death, had 
liened the partnership's real property in order to extinguish on his death his future child 
support obligations. Trial Transcript, pp. 124-125. This evidence was proffered at id., 
pp. 129-130. Glade offered this evidence to show particular instances in which Brad 
consciously acted in the interest of his family, to counter the defendants' argument that 
Brad "clearly" intended his children and second wife to have the proceeds of the policy 
at issue, payable on Brad's death, even though Brad had designated Glade as the 
beneficiary.10 This evidence, as it happens, is also relevant to the issue of whether, in 
the interest of fairness and justice, Brad's children should receive the proceeds in 
preference to the partnership even though substantial partnership assets were diverted by 
Brad's actions to them for their support. 
The trial court on remand declared "the intent of the partners" relevant to a 
determination of who is equitably entitled to the insurance proceeds. Ruling and Order 
at 8, 11, R.1894, 1901. Ironically, in the course of the earlier trial, the court at one point 
at least, indicated that the partners' professed intent was not relevant to a determination 
10The evidence indicates that when Brad intended to provide for his family, he 
consciously did so. The third Northern policy purchased in 1989, for $250,000 on 
his life, named Lissa and their children as beneficiaries. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 5. 
At the time the three Northern policies were purchased, Brad's life was also 
insured by a $572,000 Executive Life Policy, which designated Lissa and family as 
beneficiary. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3 (Application, question 18); Trial Testimony 
(S. Hansen), pp. 144-147; Trial Testimony (Lissa Buchi), pp. 116-118. Brad's life 
in 1989 was insured in the amount of $200,000, by still another, earlier purchased 
policy from Northern. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3 (Application, question 18). 
Brad's life was also insured by a $100,000 Midland policy, which the trial court in 
Brad's and Lissa's divorce ordered be maintained for the benefit of Brad's minor 
children. Trial testimony (Lissa Buchi), pp. 119-120; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 21, 
p. 5. No policy has been found, however, which designated Jo Anne as a 
beneficiary. 
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of who was entitled to the proceeds. The judge pre-empted Glade's answer to a question 
by Brad's children about how did he believe proceeds on the two policies should have 
been distributed. He did so with the comment, "I don't think it would be helpful what 
his belief would be, Counsel." Trial Transcript, p. 59. 
Glade, thus, was not given the opportunity to present at trial all evidence material 
to the issue of equitable entitlement. Nor, for that matter, were Brad's children. 
3. Glade was Prevented from Presenting Evidence Reserved for a 
Second Trial Which Would have been Relevant to the Issue of 
Equitable Entitlement. 
Judge Lubeck's declaration that the first trial was a stage for the presentation of 
every imaginable material issue, including equitable entitlement, is belied by the parties' 
pretrial Stipulation that reserved certain contingent issues to be tried in a second 
proceeding. 
Judge Stirba had approved a bifurcation of issues for trial. A claim that Glade 
had reserved, depending on the outcome of trial, was a set-off against any contractual 
obligation the court might determine he had under the buy-sell agreement, to use a 
portion of the proceeds to buy Brad's half interest in the partnership. Glade reasoned 
that if he was required to buy Brad's half interest, that his "purchase price" should be 
reduced by the amount that interest had been devalued by Brad's dissipation of "his half 
interest" prior to his death. The constituents of this dissipation, among other things, 
included (1) $69,297 of partnership money paid to Lissa, to satisfy a lien that Brad in 
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June 1997 had placed on the partnership's real property without Glade's knowledge or 
permission and which was to pay in advance the entirety of Brad's future child support 
obligation; (2) additional partnership money paid to Lissa to extinguish any claim by 
Lissa to the partnership (which Glade did approve, which Brad agreed to repay, but 
which he had not when he died); (3) thousands of dollars in unauthorized counterchecks 
drawn by Brad against the partnership's checking account (discovered after his death); 
(4) the use of partnership funds to extinguish Brad's personal credit card debt; and (5) 
the absence of any cash deposits from the Texaco station for the last several months of 
the station's operation. 
Glade's set-off argument was rendered moot when the Supreme Court held that 
the dissolution of the partnership predated Brad's death, and that the buy-sell agreement 
could not be enforced following the dissolution of the partnership. Parduhn, 2002 UT 
93,115, citing Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443, 446 (Pa. 1975) and Goergen v. 
Nebnch, 174 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); see also Fischer v. Fischer, 2003 
Ky. App. Lexis 215 (2003). However, Glade argued on remand (R.1657, 1667-1668, 
1680-1687) that this evidence that the trial court refused him permission to present is 
relevant to the issue he did not contemplate having to try in August 2001. Brad's 
dissipation of partnership assets is relevant, if not to the value of his half interest, then to 
whether his children have an equitable claim superior to the partnership which paid the 
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premiums on two policies until the date of its dissolution, and which paid $69,297 in 
advance for their support. 
D. The Trial Court Refused to Consider Evidence on Remand. Which is 
Relevant to the Question of Who Should in Equity Receive the Insurance 
Proceeds (if Glade's Contractual Right to them was Avoided by Section 
31A-21-104). 
The trial court's assigned task on remand was "to equitably distribute the 
insurance proceeds pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104(5)." Parduhn, 2002 UT 
93, f 17. It did not order the court to take additional evidence on this point. But it did 
not preclude the court from doing so, either. It surely did not imply that the court should 
ignore additional material evidence that might bear on how the proceeds, in fairness and 
justice, should be distributed. 
Glade argued on remand that equity favored an award of the proceeds to him and, 
if not to him, then to the partnership or to Brad's probate estate. R.1663-1669. He 
argued that an equitable award of the proceeds to him or, alternatively, the partnership, 
could be sustained on the basis of evidence received during the August 2001 trial. 
Hearing Transcript (May 9, 2003) p. 42; R.1663-1669. However, he argued that the 
Court could not conclude that Jo Anne or Brad's children were equitably entitled to the 
proceeds without taking additional evidence, not received at trial, which was material to 
the question of fairness and that would show that equity did not favor an award of the 
proceeds to them. Id., pp. 1669-1672; Hearing Transcript (May 9, 2003), p. 53. 
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Evidence and argument that Glade proffered and that the trial court refused to 
acknowledge or consider included: 
1. The record and details of JoAnne's petition for a divorce from Brad 
(which would be relevant to his supposed intent when he died; and which would 
countenance against an award to Jo Anne based on fairness and justice). 
2. A stipulation signed by Brad and Lissa, by which Brad (without 
Glade's knowledge) liened the partnership's real property to satisfy, on his death, his 
personal obligation for past and future child support, totaling $69,297n(which would 
suggest that the partnership has an equitable claim to the proceeds superior to 
defendants'). R.1672, 1680-1681. Also proffered were the Notice of Lien that Lissa 
recorded, R.1682, and the check for $69,297 the partnership had to pay Lissa to satisfy 
and extinguish the lien that she with Brad's complicity had recorded, R.1683. 
3. JoAnne's status as the personal representative of Brad's estate and her 
disqualification in equity to the proceeds as she has failed to articulate the estate's 
equitable claim to the proceeds. 
nThe attorney for Brad's children acted as Lissa' attorney with regard to this 
transaction and drafting this document. The children therefore had notice of this 
transaction and its purpose. 
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E. The Trial Court's Decision that Jo Anne and Brad's Children are Equitably 
Entitled to Proceeds is Flawed by its Failure to Consider all Evidence 
Relevant to that Issue. 
Findings based on equitable grounds will generally be reversed only when the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings made by the trial court. Jensen v. 
Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
The findings "in equity" made by the trial court, however, must have some basis 
in the record. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Utah 1991). While there maybe 
a presumption of correctness, findings in equity cases must be overturned and the 
judgment reversed, if the appeals court has a definite and firm conviction that the trial 
court has erred. Id Findings, furthermore, are only as good as the evidence that 
supports them. In this case, the court's findings are irreversibly tainted by its refusal to 
consider on remand facts material to the issue of equitable distribution (that even the 
court described as "facts tailored to the issue before the court"); and which Glade had no 
realistic opportunity at the first trial to present. 
F. The Trial Court's Findings and Holding on Remand are Further Flawed 
Because They Were Based on Evidence not Presented at Trial. 
The trial court's self-declaration that it confined its decision-making process to 
evidence presented in the course of the prior trial is also untrue. To the contrary, the 
trial court picked and chose from untested and unproven evidence proffered by the 
defendants, where it fit the court's preconceived determination that Buchi's second wife 
and children should receive them. The following examples establish this point. 
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1. The Trial Court Found "Persuasive" the Supposed Sale of the 
Partnership's Personal Property, for Which There is no Support in 
the Evidence at Trial. 
In the course of final oral argument on May 9, 2003, Buchi's children argued that 
the insurance policies could not be partnership property because Blackett Oil Company 
had purchased all the partnership's property and assets in mid-July, 1997 and no one, 
including Glade and University Texaco had argued that the policies belonged to Blackett 
Oil. Transcript at 23-24, 28, 63-67. This novel argument had not been made before, not 
even in the memorandum filed by Brad's children. R.1777. There was no evidence at 
the prior trial to support the conclusion that University Texaco had sold all its assets, 
including personal property and insurance policies to Blackett Oil Company. R.1929, 
1932-1933,1935,1937-1943. In fact, it did not. R.1939atT[l. Nonetheless, and even 
though there was no evidence at the prior trial to support this speculation, the trial court 
found this to be a singularly persuasive argument for concluding that the policies were 
not partnership property12 and that University Texaco, therefore, did not have an 
equitable claim to the proceeds: 
12Glade's position is that the partners, not the partnership, owned the two Northern 
policies. This conclusion, however, has nothing to do with the partnership's sale 
of its real property and stations in July, 1997. Rather, ownership by the partners 
was previously established by the partners' mutual decision and conscious choice 
when they applied for insurance. See 1989 Applications for insurance, Plaintiffs 
Trial Exhibits 3 and 4 (Question No. 31). Just above the partners' signatures, on 
both Applications, it says, "Any policy . . . issued on this Application will belong 
only to the Owner." 
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The court finds that the policy was not intended to be a 
partnership asset. Here the business was sold to Blackett 
Oil. No one seemingly thinks that the policies thus belongs 
to Blackett Oil. That factor alone seems to indicate the 
policies did not belong to the partnership and were not 
considered a partnership asset. 
Opinion at 9, R.1902 (emphasis added). 
Defendants proposed Findings of Fact that referenced the preceding finding. 
R.1953. Glade objected, and pointed out that the evidence received in the prior trial did 
not support the conclusion that University Texaco had sold assets other than real 
property to Blackett Oil.13 [Glade's] Objections to Proposed Findings. R.1929-1935, 
1947-1948. In its follow-up memorandum the trial court acknowledged its error: 
As to the proposed order and judgment on remand, the court 
will sign that order and has done so this date with the 
plaintiffs suggested modification. The "partnership" was 
not sold to Blackett Oil and the evidence did not support 
that the partnership was sold. Exhibit 11 shows only that 
Blackett Oil purchases from seller "University Texaco 
Company" something for the price of $1,000,000.00. The 
order is signed with that interlineation as proposed by 
plaintiff. 
R.1972 (emphasis added). This correction, however, did not cause the court to amend 
its decision, notwithstanding its earlier emphasis on this phantom evidence. 
13University Texaco with the sale of its stations, however, ceased its service station 
business. It immediately, after July 14, 1997, began the process of winding up its 
financial affairs. 
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2. The Trial Court also Based its holding on Remand in Part, on its 
Finding that the Partners 'Treated the Partnership Casually" and 
that the Partnership Proceeds Were Frequently and Regularly Used 
for Personal Expenses, Though There was No Evidence of this at 
Trial. 
The trial court's finding to the above effect is found at pp. 9-10 of its Ruling and 
Order dated May 14, 2003. There is no evidence, however, to support this finding in the 
testimony or exhibits received by the court at trial on August 21, 2001. Evidence cannot 
be marshaled in support of this finding because there is none. 
The defendants argued that there was support for such a finding, but the 
"support" they identified in or attached to their memoranda was from pretrial affidavits 
and depositions that were NOT introduced at trial. Both JoAnne and Brad's children 
in their memoranda included excerpts from Glade's deposition. JoAnne's Memo., 
R.1854-1857; Exhibit D to Brad's children's Memo, R.1777. At least JoAnne conceded 
that, "the Supreme Court did not rule on this issue because Glade's testimony cited 
above was not before the court." R.1858. JoAnne's Memorandum introduced and 
relied on an alleged stipulation between Brad and JoAnne (R.1860) that was not 
appended to her memorandum, was not identified or produced in discovery, was not 
among her exhibits identified for trial (R.l 155), and was not offered or received at trial 
(see R.1443). JoAnne even resurrected and relied on an affidavit she filed in this case 
on March 13, 2000 (R.l859, 1860) EVEN THOUGH JUDGE STIRBA ON 
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NOVEMBER 8, 2000 ORDERED THAT JOANNE'S AFFIDAVIT BE STRICKEN! 
R.1145. 
Glade protested that findings on remand could not be based on depositions, 
pretrial affidavits, and other "evidence" not received at trial, as such testimony (1) had 
not been subjected to cross-examination, and (2) would be subject to relevance, hearsay, 
foundation and other objections. Oral argument, May 9 , 2003 (Fishburn), p. 42. Judge 
Lubeck pointedly asked counsel for Brad's children, "Do you think that the trial record 
demonstrates some of those things you just told me about vehicles, house payments?" 
Hearing Transcript, p. 25. Counsel Martin Tanner responded, "Absolutely. Absolutely 
it does." Judge Lubeck accepted this assurance. The only problem is no such evidence 
was introduced at trial (as Jo Anne, in her memorandum, conceded). 
III. THE "EQUITIES" DO NOT FAVOR AN AWARD OF ALL OR A 
PORTION OF THE PROCEEDS TO JOANNE AND/OR TO BRAD'S 
CHILDREN, IN PREFERENCE TO GLADE, UNIVERSITY TEXACO, 
OR BRAD'S ESTATE, 
A Equity Cannot Condone an Award of Any of the Proceeds to Jo Anne. 
1. Equity, first, cannot condone a distribution of proceeds directly and 
personally to Jo Anne, as she has forsaken her fiduciary duty to Brad's estate. One who 
comes before a court seeking equity must come before it with clean hands. LHIW, Inc. 
v. De Lorean. 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). Jo Anne sought and received appointment 
as the personal representative of Brad's estate. At least six creditors have filed claims 
against the estate. In re Estate of Brad Kevin Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
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County, Probate No. 973901394. Jo Anne joined this action as the personal 
representative of Brad's estate, as well as in her personal capacity. R. 275. Since 
March 2000, however, JoAnne has maintained that she and not Brad's estate should 
receive the proceeds. As personal representative of Brad's estate, she, given her 
injection of Section 31A-21-104 into this case and especially given the Supreme Court's 
September 2002 Decision, has a duty to articulate the estate's equitable claim to the 
proceeds.14 Judge Lubeck in fact identified Brad's estate as one of the "persons" who 
might equitably be entitled to the proceeds. Instead, and to the detriment of the estate 
which she is charged with administering, JoAnne advocated the entry of an Order by 
which the estate was altogether cut out of the equation and one-half the proceeds were to 
be distributed directly to her, personally. Her quest to obtain the insurance proceeds, 
personally, without articulating the estate's position in an action in which she is the 
estate's legal representative, is a breach of her fiduciary duty to the estate. Under this 
circumstance, the trial court erred in determining that JoAnne, personally, is equitably 
entitled to half the insurance proceeds in preference to the partnership and Brad's estate, 
to the detriment of the estate and its creditors. This factor alone should disqualify her 
personal claim to the proceeds in equity. 
14The estate would benefit, as well, if the proceeds were distributed in equity to the 
partnership, which would result in the eventual pass-through of a portion of the 
proceeds to the estate. 
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2. There, second, is no evidence before the Court that Brad intended that 
JoAnne have any of the proceeds or, for that matter, anything as a consequence of his 
marriage to her. JoAnne cannot have been the object of the policy when purchased, as 
Brad, at the time, was married to Lissa. In the application for the policy, Brad named 
Glade to be the beneficiary; not Lissa and certainly not JoAnne (whom he did not marry 
until three years later). Brad did not provide for JoAnne by the purchase of any life 
insurance policies naming her as the beneficiary, as he did for Lissa and his children. 
He did not provide for JoAnne by will. JoAnne had sued for divorce because of 
irreconcilable differences, they had lived apart since October 1995, and they had already 
divided their personal property. 
3. There, third, is no evidence of a good relationship between JoAnne 
and Brad, based on which it might be concluded that JoAnne is equitably entitled to a 
portion of the proceeds. The entirety of JoAnne's trial testimony is contained in two 
pages of trial transcript.15 Transcript (August 21, 2001), pp. 151-153. JoAnne testified 
15There was a reason for the brevity of JoAnne's testimony. Prior to the December 
2000 trial setting, Glade included in his designation of trial exhibits a Record 
showing JoAnne's conviction in 1992 on one felony count for theft by deception. 
See R.1211, 1213 (designation of trial exhibits) and R.1253-1255 (record of 
conviction). The court's Judgment and Order had also decreed that JoAnne was 
not to hold any employment by which she would be allowed "any type of control 
over other's monies." As JoAnne had insisted pre-trial that Brad had intended her 
to have the proceeds of the policy that Glade owned, Glade contemplated using the 
record of her convictions to impeach her credibility, per Rule of Evidence 609. 
JoAnne then used the time between the first and second trial settings to engineer an 
expungement of her record of conviction. On April 23, 2001, she then filed a 
motion in limine, by which she sought a ruling that Glade could not introduce her 
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that she married Brad on May 18, 1992, and that she remained Brad's "legal wife" at the 
time of his death. She volunteered that she and Brad had been separated for a year. On 
cross-examination, she admitted that she had sought and accepted appointment as the 
personal representative of Brad's estate, and that no will had been found. Jo Anne did 
not testify that there was an especially loving relationship between she and Brad or even 
a good one. 
The trial court, on remand, without justification refused to consider that Jo Anne, 
on April 2, 1996, filed a Complaint by which she sought to divorce Brad. R.1693. The 
trial court's refusal to consider this evidence was error, especially in light of its finding 
that Brad "intended" JoAnne to have half the insurance proceeds payable on his death. 
In her complaint for divorce, JoAnne alleged that "the parties have experienced 
difficulties that cannot be reconciled." f 5. She volunteered that she and Brad had been 
separated since October 1995 and had not lived together since. 14. They had already 
divided all their personal property, f 14. According to an entry on the docket sheet for 
August 5, 199716, JoAnne's counsel was preparing "final settlement papers" (not 
record of conviction to impeach her credibility. R.1234, 1227. Glade opposed her 
motion. R.1242-1249. Just prior to the August 2001 trial, the Court decided that it 
would first hear what JoAnne had to say, and whether she offered any testimony 
that would place her credibility at issue, before he ruled on JoAnne's motion. 
R.1260, 1412. As JoAnne testified as to nothing more than stated above, Glade 
concluded she had not put her credibility at issue and therefore did not seek to 
introduce her convictions as an exhibit or through testimony. 
16Brad's body was found August 8, 1997. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 6. 
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dismissal papers) which were soon to be submitted to the court. R.1677. 
Approximately ten to twelve days after Brad died, but only after he died, Jo Anne moved 
to dismiss her complaint. Id. 
Jo Anne, as Brad's not-yet-divorced spouse, may be entitled by law to one-half of 
whatever proceeds pass through Brad's estate and after payment of his creditors. 
However, there is no evidence based on their marital relationship, aside from the marital 
relationship, that warrants proceeds being distributed directly to her in equity. 
B. The Evidence at Trial was Inadequate to Support an Award, in Equity, of 
One-Half the Proceeds to Brad's Children. 
There is no evidence that Brad intended these insurance proceeds to go directly to 
his children, if intent is a criterion for equitable distribution. Brad specifically provided 
for his children by other means: by their express designation as secondary beneficiaries 
on multiple life insurance policies and by the assignment, expressly to them and for their 
exclusive benefit, of a $100,000 Midland Life Insurance policy as part of the final 
divorce decree between him and Lissa. 
A loving and close relationship perhaps existed between Brad, as father, and his 
children. However, to the extent this might be the basis of an equitable award, it was 
not established by any evidence at trial. None of Brad's children testified at the trial. 
Brad's children paid none of the premiums to purchase the insurance and, thus, 
can make no equitable claim on that basis. They did not own the policy and they were 
not its designated beneficiary. An award to them would be an unjustified windfall, 
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where there is no evidence that Brad intended them to receive the proceeds of this policy 
(whereas he did on others). Moreover, it is not fair that the children should be deemed 
equitably entitled to the proceeds in preference to the partnership, when Brad, as a 
consequence of his death, diverted substantial partnership funds ($69,297) to the 
advance payment of their support before he died. 
IV. AN AWARD IN EQUITY CANNOT BE BASED ON AN AGREEMENT 
THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS HELD IS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
The Supreme Court held that on the partnership's dissolution, the partners' buy-
sell agreement could no longer be enforced by Brad's heirs. That holding 
notwithstanding, the trial court on remand claimed to divine the partners' "intent" from 
this unenforceable agreement, then used that as justification for an award based on 
fairness and justice. 
Although the buy-sell agreement was no longer effective, as 
decided by the Supreme Court, it does provide guidance in 
deciding Buchi's and Parduhn's intent when they obtained 
their policies. 
Ruling and Order (May 14, 2003) at 9. The court erred in basing its award in equity on 
this unenforceable agreement and the "intent" it speculated could be gleaned from it. 
It is manifest error for the trial court to have "found" intent and used that as its 
basis for an equitable award, based on an unenforceable agreement. The effect, first, is 
that the court on remand chose to enforce the agreement against Glade - even though 
the Supreme Court had just declared it not to be enforceable. Second, "intent" as the 
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basis of an equitable division of proceeds cannot be inferred from this unenforceable 
agreement, because the partners had to have realized that the agreement would not act as 
a conduit for all or a portion of the insurance proceeds should the partnership be 
dissolved by reason other than what would trigger the buy-sell agreement. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON REMAND IN DECIDING TO AWARD 
THE PROCEEDS BASED ON WHAT IT IMAGINED THE PARTNERS 
WOULD HAVE DONE WITH THE POLICIES HAD BRAD LIVED 
LONGER, 
The trial court appears to have intended as a finding of fact its conclusion at page 
10 of its May 14 Ruling and Order, that the two Northern policies "in an accounting 
between the partners,. . . would have been divided fairly and equitably between the 
parties." Based on this assumption, the court conjectures that the partners would have 
exchanged ownership of their policies and re-designated beneficiaries had Brad lived 
longer.17 This, however, is nothing more than speculation. Moreover, it ignores several 
critical facts: (1) there was no longer any contingent obligation to fund, given the 
partnership's dissolution; (2) the policies were owned, not by the partnership, but by the 
individual partners - who therefore controlled their fate; (3) the individual partners had 
options other than the single option conceived by the trial court; and (4) most critically -
Brad died before the possibility imagined by the court could occur. 
17The trial court thus imagined that Glade would have assigned the policy he 
owned on Brad's life to Brad who, once he owned the policy, would have changed 
the designation of the beneficiary to himself. 
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A buy-sell agreement creates a contingent obligation, that may be triggered by an 
event such as death of a partner. It is a contingent obligation that may never be 
triggered, in the case of a partnership, if the partners voluntarily decide to dissolve the 
partnership or if the partnership is dissolved by another cause of dissolution recognized 
by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28. Insurance is a device by which funds, 
hopefully, will be available to fund a surviving partner's purchase obligation, if'that 
contingency is triggered by his partner's death or another contractually specified event. 
There is no reason that the amount of insurance purchased cannot exceed the sum that 
may be needed by a surviving partner; indeed it would be prudent to purchase more 
insurance than it is foreseen may be needed especially where projected buy-sell amounts 
are variable based on performance of the business and/or other factors. 
Because a purchase obligation under a buy-sell agreement is a contingent 
obligation that may never arise (and most often probably does not), then the question of 
what to do with the insurance that was purchased to fund the never-realized obligation 
may arise. If the partners chose to designate the partnership as the owner of the policies, 
and the policies are term policies, then the policies will lapse due to the partnership's 
failure to continue payment of the premiums. If the policies are whole life, then the 
accumulated cash values will likely be surrendered to the partnership and become assets 
subject to distribution under partnership law. 
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A different result follows where the partnership dissolves, but the partners 
designated themselves as owners of the policies. Jones v. Simmons. 209 N.W.2d 840 
(Mich. App. 1973). Dissolution of the partnership does not change the fact that the 
partners, not the partnership, own the policies. As owner, each partner controls, and 
should control, the fate of the policy he owns. A possibility in this case, had Brad lived 
longer, is that Brad and Glade each would have "cashed out" the whole life policies they 
owned. On July 15, 1997, Brad had this right on the policy he owned as there no longer 
existed a contingent obligation to buy out Glade's partnership interest in the event Glade 
died; Glade also had this right on the policy he owned (which he might have exercised 
before Brad died). Glade and Brad might have cross-assigned ownership of the policies, 
as they did with the Northern policies purchased in 1984. One or both of them also 
might have chosen to maintain their policy on the other, and personally assume the 
obligation to pay the premiums that the partnership had paid. The cash surrender value 
would continue to accrue to the partner who owned the policy. Under the traditional 
legal application of "insurable interest," by which a beneficiary's insurable interest is 
determined when the insurance is acquired and not when the insured dies,18 there is 
18The Supreme Court cited no authority other than the statute and did not explain 
its basis for deciding that an insurable interest of a beneficiary in the life of an 
insured person must exist at the time of the insured's death, as well as when the 
insurance was purchased. Parduhn v. Bennett, supra, ]flf 16-17. There is no 
language in the statute that requires or warrants this conclusion. It is a conclusion 
that is at variance with prior Utah case law. See Culbertson v. Continental Assur. 
Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981) (which the Supreme Court did not overrule) 
(holding that a former spouse previously made a beneficiary by her remarried 
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and would be no impropriety in doing so. Nor should there be, as no public policy is 
violated. Lissa, for example, chose to pay the premiums and keep the 1989 $250,000 
whole life policy she owned on Brad's life current and in effect, even though she 
arguably no longer had an insurable interest in Brad's life once she divorced him in 
1992. As owner of the policy, she kept the premiums current and received the proceeds 
paid on his death. There should be nothing wrong in her doing so, although the 
Supreme Court's September 2002 Decision suggests otherwise. 
The fact is that several options were available to the partners immediately after 
July 14, 1997 concerning the disposition of their policies. The trial judge's speculation 
as to what they might have done (see Ruling and Order at 10) is just that, speculation. It 
is suspicion and guess, and nothing more. Compare Oglesby-Barnitz Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Clark, 175 N.E.2d 98, 104 (Ohio App. 1959). There is no evidence in the trial record 
to marshall in its support, except perhaps a speculative inference drawn from the buy-
sell agreement which the Supreme Court decreed that Brad's heirs could not enforce. 
What the partners might have done with the policies also does not change the fact 
that on Brad's death, the policy on his life was at that moment in time still in effect, was 
husband, retained her designation as beneficiary on his death even though she had 
previously divorced him). The Supreme Court's conclusion is against the weight 
of virtually all authorities on life insurance law, which are to the effect that 
insurable interest is determined when life insurance is purchased, not when 
the insured person dies. See 1 Freedman's Richards on Insurance. § 2.4 (6th ed. 
1990); 2 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice. §763 (1966); 43 Am.Jur.2d 
Insurance. § 977 (1982); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer. 94 U.S. 
457, 24 L.Ed. 251 (1877); Dalbv v. Life Ins. Co.. 15 C.B. 365 (1854). 
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owned by Glade, and designated Glade as the beneficiary of the proceeds payable on 
Brad's death. 
VI. WITH THE DEMISE OF THE BUY-SELL AGREEMENT. THERE NO 
LONGER EXISTS A BASIS FOR A NON-TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER 
DIRECTLY TO BRAD'S HEIRS. BYPASSING HIS ESTATE. 
In her Ruling dated May 22, 2000, Judge Stirba decreed that if 'the buy-sell 
agreement was enforceable by Brad's heirs, then it would operate to channel either 
$100,000 or $300,000 (if the 1984 agreement was found to be implicitly amended in 
1989) directly to them as a non-testamentary transfer recognized by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-6-201. Thus, if 'the buy-sell agreement survived dissolution, then at least a portion 
of the proceeds would bypass Brad's estate and go directly to his heirs. 
Given the Supreme Court's holding on appeal that the buy-sell agreement did not 
survive the partnership's dissolution on July 14, 1997, there is no longer a basis in law 
or equity to prefer Brad's heirs over his estate. Brad left no will, so that will not 
accomplish the objective. There is no instrument or agreement, given the demise of the 
buy-sell agreement, to effect a non-testamentary transfer that can bypass Brad's estate. 
The trial court, on remand, nonetheless and still found that Brad intended all the 
proceeds of the policy on his life to go to his children, and to the wife he would marry 
well after the partners' 1984 amended buy-sell agreement and the insurance they 
purchased in 1989. Even if support could be found in the trial record for this finding, 
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there is no equitable warrant, given the demise of the buy-sell agreement, for bypassing 
Brad's estate and the creditors who have claims against his estate. 
VII. AN AWARD IN EQUITY BASED ON "INTENT" DIVINED FROM AN 
UNENFORCEABLE BUY SELL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT, IN ANY 
EVENT, DIVERT MORE THAN $100,000 TO DEFENDANTS, 
Glade argued on the first appeal that the trial court had erred when it held that the 
partners' purchase of the two Northern policies in 1989 implicitly amended their buy-
sell agreement, last amended in writing in 1984. The Supreme Court did not reach this 
argument, concluding instead that the buy-sell agreement was not enforceable by Brad's 
heirs. If, however, an unenforceable agreement can be the basis for determining the 
partners' intent as to who should have the proceeds and that, in turn, becomes the basis 
of equitable award, then the challenge Glade raised on the first appeal is again germane. 
The 1984 written amendment to the buy-sell agreement provided that each 
partner agreed to pay the other's survivors the sum of $100,000 for the deceased 
partner's interest in the partnership. Funding for that obligation was to be assured by the 
purchase of a policy in the amount of $ 100,000. Neither partner ever agreed to pay 
more than $100,000. Trial Testimony (G. Parduhn). No subsequent written agreement 
evidenced their intention to pay more than $100,000. 
Although the partners in 1989 increased their insurance on each other (though not 
in equal amounts), they did not amend the amount each agreed to pay to buy out the 
other's interest should events require. That the partners chose in 1989 to purchase 
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increased whole life policies on each other's life, but did not in writing amend their 
prior buy-sell agreement, is not a sufficient warrant for concluding that they implicitly 
amended their buy-sell agreement. See Oglesby-Barnitz Bank & Trust Co. v. Clark, 175 
N.E.2d 98 (Ohio App. 1959) (case discussed in detail in Appellant's Brief (January 25, 
2002), at 69-73). Defendants presented no evidence at trial that the value of the 
partnership and its property ever approached $600,000, which is a logical predicate for 
one to assume that the only purpose of the partners purchasing $300,000 and $250,000 
policies was to fund a buy-sell agreement that had supposedly been reached consistent 
with the higher amounts. According to Glade, only about $100,000 remained after the 
stations were sold and trust deed liens and encumbrances on the partnership's real 
property were satisfied. Trial Testimony (Parduhn), p. 36. 
VIII. IF DEFENDANTS9 DEFENSE BASED ON SECTION 31A-21-104 WAS 
NOT WAIVED, AND EQUITY THUS GOVERNS WHO SHOULD HAVE 
THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS, THEN THE PROCEEDS SHOULD GO 
TO GLADE, 
A. A Primary Purpose of Section 31A-21-104 is to Pre-empt the Common 
Law Remedy of Avoidance of Insurance by the Insurer, if the Beneficiary 
is Concluded not to Have had an Insurable Interest in the Insured's Life. 
"Insurable interest" is a legal principle, according to 1 Freedman's Richards on 
Insurance § 2.1 at 151 (1990), that originated with Acts of the English parliament in 
1746 and 1774. The prevalence of the general populace betting on the lives of 
prominent men in England during the eighteenth century, according to Freedman, 
prompted the enactment of a statute in 1774, Statute 14 Geo. Ill, C. 48, which prohibited 
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wagering on lives when the holder of the insurance had no insurable interest in the life 
of the person whose life was insured. Id § 2.2 at 155. The prerequisite of "insurable 
interest" was imported into American common law, principally by the courts. See e.g., 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer. 94 U.S. 457, 24 L.Ed. 251 (1877). 
As the doctrine of "insurable interest" developed, it became available to 
insurance companies as an affirmative defense to a claim brought by a beneficiary for 
payment of policy proceeds on death of an insured. Most states that have considered the 
issue have held that only the insurer has standing to invoke such a defense, and that a 
stranger to the insurance contract may not do so. Ryan v. Tickle, 316 N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 
1982) (and authorities cited therein). The recognized remedy for proving a beneficiary's 
lack of insurable interest is avoidance of the insurance contract, which means that the 
beneficiary does not get and the insurer does not have to pay the proceeds that the 
insurer, by contract, is otherwise obligated to pay. 
There is no legislative history on Section 31A-21-104 to be found, other than the 
drafts of bills leading to final enactment. Nonetheless, the principal purpose of its 
enactment (which was part of a major overhaul of the insurance code) may be inferred 
from its modification of what was theretofore the common law remedy where an insurer 
proved that the beneficiary lacked an insurable interest in the insured's life when the 
insurance was initially obtained. That modification is in Section 31 A-21-104(5), which 
provides that "an insurance policy is not invalid because the policyholder lacks insurable 
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interest or because consent has not been given, but a court with appropriate jurisdiction 
may order the proceeds to be paid to some person who is equitably entitled to them . . .." 
This section thus provides that if a policy is avoidable because the beneficiary did not 
have an insurable interest in the insured's life, that the proceeds still must be paid to 
someone. That "someone" would be whoever is equitably entitled to them, under the 
applicable facts. 
B. On the Facts of this Case, Equity Warrants an Award of the Insurance 
Proceeds to Glade. 
1. There is no Reason in Justice and Fairness that Glade Should not be 
Awarded the Proceeds. 
There is no public policy reason why Glade should not receive the proceeds to 
which he would otherwise be entitled as the beneficiary designated by the policy. He 
did not wager on a stranger's life. He did not obtain the insurance on Brad's life 
without Brad's knowledge or consent; to the contrary, Brad signed the application. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 3 (see last three pages). No public policy is violated should 
he retain proceeds in excess of that needed to fund a contingent purchase obligation 
which, in this case, proved to be zero. See Ridley v. VanderBoegh, 511 P.2d 273, 280 
(Ida. 1973). 
2. In Justice and Fairness, the Insurance Proceeds in this Case Should 
be Awarded to Glade 
Under the facts of this case, equity favors an award of the proceeds to Glade, for 
the following reasons: 
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First, Brad consciously designated Glade as the person who should receive the 
proceeds should he die. He did so by signing the application, which unambiguously 
designated Glade as the beneficiary of the policy. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3. Brad also 
consented to Glade's designation of owner, which means Glade (a) owned the right to 
the cash value that accumulated under the policy, and (b) retained control over whom 
the policy designated as beneficiary. This is the only evidence of who Brad in 1989 
intended to have the proceeds of this policy should he die. 
Brad may have contemplated that his children and, perhaps, his wife would 
receive $100,000 for his interest in the partnership should the partnership be dissolved 
because of his death. There is no reason, however, to speculate that Brad thought his 
wife or children would get the insurance proceeds if the partnership was dissolved 
before he died, and no purchase obligation by the surviving partner remained. In that 
situation, at least had he thought about it, he surely would have understood that his 
estate would be entitled to the value of his partnership interest at death, and his children 
and his wife would divide the residual assets of his estate. 
Second, Glade owned the policy. The policy, with Brad's consent, designated 
Glade as the owner of the policy.19 That the partnership paid the premiums on the two 
policies (one owned by Glade and the other owned by Brad) does not make the 
partnership the owner of the policies where the partners consciously designated 
19Supra. n. 12 at 42. 
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themselves to be the owners. See Esswein v. Rogers, 216 Cal. App. 2d 91, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
738, 741 (1963)20; Jones v. Simmons, 209 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Mich. App. 1973). 
Third, Glade had an insurable interest in Brad's life, as his partner for eighteen 
years. He did not have an insurable interest for only about two-and-a-half to three 
weeks, if the September 6, 2002 Supreme Court Opinion is meant to depart from the 
almost universal law on insurable interest and Utah precedent to the contrary. 
Glade very clearly had an insurable interest in Brad's life (as Brad had in his) 
when they embarked on their business venture and, later, when they in 1989 purchased 
the two new policies from Northern. According to the common law, a partner in a 
business has an insurable interest in his partner's life, which arises from their 
relationship as partners. Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.5(3) (1988).21 He has an 
20The court, in Esswein, explained its holding as follows: 
The fact that the premiums were paid for out of 
partnership funds does not justify an affirmative 
answer to the question. Surely partners may provide, 
at the expense of the partnership that each shall be 
insured, with his wife as the beneficiary, just as each 
partner may be given a monthly sum out of partnership 
funds to be expended as the recipient wishes. No 
principle of law dictates that partners shall not agree to 
make use of partnership funds for other than purely 
partnership purposes. 
21
 See also Appleman on Insurance § 871 ("a partnership has an insurable interest in 
the life of the deceased partner, just as each partner has an interest in the life of the 
other"); Freedman's Richards on Insurance § 2.3 at 162 (6th ed. 1990) ("partners 
who have contributed to the partnership have insurable interests in the lives of 
each other, as does the partnership in the lives of the partners"); Graves v. Norred, 
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insurable interest in his partner's life even in the absence of a buy-sell agreement. Ridley 
v. VanderBoegh, 511 P.2d 273, 280 (Ida. 1973). The agent who took Brad's and 
Glade's applications for insurance, Sheldon Hansen, testified that he was authorized to 
accept their applications based on their relationship as business partners, even had there 
been no buy-sell agreement for the insurance to fund. Trial Testimony (S. Hansen), pp. 
137-141. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104(2), consistent with common law, states that 
persons who are not related by blood or law nonetheless have an insurable interest in the 
lives of others when "they have a lawful and substantial interest in having the life, health 
and safety of the person insured continued." Business partners invest money and their 
time in joint enterprises, on expectations that are intrinsically tied to the contribution, 
effort, abilities, acumen and reputation of their partners. Section 31A-21-104 does not, 
as Appellees have argued, provide that business partners have an insurable interest in 
their partners' lives only if they have as between them a buy-sell agreement enforceable 
on dissolution of the partnership (and, at that, only in an amount they might be required 
to pay for a partner's interest). Even if that is what it meant, Glade had an insurable 
interest in Brad's life, as one purpose of the two policies was to fund each partner's 
510 So.2d 816, 818 (Ala. 1987) ("It is not the mere existence of the partnership 
which provides the basis for the insurable interest. It is the insuring partner's 
reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the insured's. 
life"); Rich v. Class, 643 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Mo. App. 1982) (a "partner has an 
insurable interest in the life of another partner which arises from their business 
relationship"). 
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contingent obligation to pay the deceased partner's heirs $100,000 to buy the decedent's 
interest, had the partnership been dissolved by the death of the other partner. 
There is, in the interest of justice, no reason to declare that Glade should 
suddenly be deprived of proceeds, in which he had a lawful contingent interest as 
beneficiary for eighteen years. The burden of winding up the partnership (including 
defending against three lawsuits) fell on Glade's shoulders when Brad died. To say that 
Glade has no equitable interest in the proceeds because Brad died three weeks after the 
partnership's dissolution is not fair, nor does it in any way promote or serve the interest 
of justice. 
Fourth, it is fair that Glade receive the proceeds as the defendants allowed the 
policy that Brad owned to be cannibalized. That the policies purchased in 1989 were 
whole life policies, clearly establishes the partners' intention that the policies would 
serve some function in addition to funding a contingent purchase obligation, should the 
partnership ever be dissolved on the death of one of them. 
Appellees' logic is that the policies, notwithstanding what they say, were in 
reality owned by and for the benefit of the insureds. If that were true, and that was how 
they were structured, then Glade should have been able to access the cash value in 
Brad's policy (on Glade's life). He could not because Brad's estate, not Glade, owned 
the policy. The estate never tendered ownership of the second policy to Glade. Instead, 
it did nothing as the policy drew on the cash value to pay the premiums, until the cash 
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value was gone and the policy lapsed. If the defendants' counterclaim had been based in 
equity (it was not), then principles of justice should have required them to tender to 
Glade the policy on Glade's life that they controlled. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Glade Parduhn, asks that the Supreme Court on this second 
appeal afford him the following relief: 
1. Reverse the trial court's Judgment and Order on remand, which decreed that 
Jo Anne and Brad's children were equitably entitled to all life insurance proceeds paid by 
Northern Life Insurance Company under policy No. NL00989085, on Brad's death. 
2. Hold that the defendants/appellees' defense based on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
21-104 was waived by their failure to plead it, and remand this case with instructions to 
award all the proceeds to Glade. Glade also asks that the instructions on remand, 
consistent with the holding he has requested, order the trial court to direct the 
defendants/appellees to return to the court those proceeds erroneously and prematurely 
distributed to them in September/October 2001 on penalty of a judgment to be entered 
against them if they do not. 
3. In the alternative, reverse the trial court's Judgment and Order entered on 
remand and remand to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine who is equitably entitled to the Northern proceeds paid on Brad Buchi's 
death, consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion on this second appeal. The Supreme 
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Court should also order that the trial court authorize on remand a brief period of 
discovery on issues relevant to an equitable award of the proceeds. 
4. If this n latter is rei nai ided for fi irtl lei pro :eedings, it shoi lldbe coi ipled w itl 1 
a directive that Jo Anne Buchi, personally, may not receive any portion of the proceeds. 
DATED this I? day of December, 2003. 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P. C ' 
By: 
P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq., 
Attorneys for Appellant, Glade Parduhn 
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